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Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and Burdens 
WKHRU\Pi
William McGeveran†
Some weeks later, reviewing my notes from the 2010 Trademark Scholars’ Roundtable 
(and Rebecca Tushnet’s invaluable contemporaneous blogging1), I am struck again by the 
rich and engaging discussion over a wide range of issues. I am also struck by the way we 
repeatedly circled, but in my opinion never quite pinned down, the related structural mecha-
QLVPVRISUHVXPSWLRQVGHIHQVHVDQGEXUGHQV:LWKDOOWKHELJLGHDVÁ\LQJDURXQGWKHURRP
there were times when many of us (myself included) talked past one another on these more 
mundane details of civil procedure—perhaps an inevitable outcome when 20 law professors 
gather around a table. But as Bob Bone emphasized in his prepared comments, the distribu-
tion of burdens and the mechanics of rules, while they come after the major normative deci-
sions, embody those decisions and will determine whether the resulting reform functions as 
intended. In this very short comment I hope to build on our discussion to clarify the meaning 
and import of these three concepts, and show how they relate to the range of proposals we 
considered.
Late in the Roundtable, Eric Goldman aptly summarized one persistent strand of the discus-
sion. He suggested that many of us want to build a “fast lane” for resolution of certain types of 
trademark cases, akin to the express line at the grocery store for customers with ten or fewer 
items. Like several of us, he pointed to 47 U.S.C. § 230 (exempting internet intermediaries 
from most liability arising from user-generated content) as an existing legal model of a reason-
ably effective fast lane.2 Courts promptly dismiss cases that fall within the parameters of the
† Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Many thanks to the participants in the Second 
Trademark Scholars’ Roundtable at DePaul University College of Law in April 2010, and particularly to orga-
nizers Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, for a remarkably stimulating conference. I received valuable research 
assistance on this comment from Mikka Gee Conway.
1.  Rebecca Tushnet, Second Trademark Scholars Roundtable, Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)Log (April 16, 2010, 
30KWWSWXVKQHWEORJVSRWFRPVHFRQGWUDGHPDUNVFKRODUVURXQGWDEOHKWPOFRQWDLQLQJWKHÀUVW
of three detailed posts on the Roundtable).
2.  Of course, some commentators argue that § 230 immunity is too generous, for normative reasons. See, e.g., 
Ann Bartow, ,QWHUQHW'HIDPDWLRQDV3URÀW&HQWHU7KH0RQHWL]DWLRQRI2QOLQH+DUDVVPHQW, 32 Harv. J. L. & 
Gender 383, 417–19 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, &\EHU&LYLO5LJKWV, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 116–17 & n.377 
(2009). That is not my concern here; whatever one’s views on the merits of the protection conferred by § 230, as 
a procedural matter it functions as a fast lane.
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3.  See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 
(RMB), 2009 WL 1704355 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (E.D. Va. 2008); DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998).
4.  This is so even when it is expressed ungrammatically as “10 items or less.”
5.  See86&IIRUDGHÀQLWLRQ&RXUWVKDYHVLQFHGHYHORSHGWKLVGHÀQLWLRQVRWKDWLWFDQEHDS-
plied unambiguously in almost all cases, as the cases cited in note 3 demonstrate.
6.  Id. § 230(c).
7.  Id. § 230(e).
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§ 230 exemption, often on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.3 A fast lane for trademark law would allow 
similarly swift disposition of certain cases.
Building on Goldman’s analogy, I think there are two salient features of the supermarket 
H[SUHVVODQHWKDWDOVRKROGWUXHIRUWUDGHPDUNGRFWULQH)LUVWWKHGHÀQLWLRQRIHOLJLELOLW\IRU
the fast lane must be quite clear. “Ten or fewer items” is a bright-line rule.4 Like any rule, 
WKHUHZLOOEHGLIÀFXOWFDVHV2QHFDQLPDJLQHDGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUZKHWKHUDEDJRIDSSOHV
counts as one item or several. Even then, a simple heuristic can resolve most such disputes: 
SHUKDSV DQ LWHPFRXOGEHGHÀQHG DV HDFKXQLW WKH FDVKLHUPXVW VFDQ VHSDUDWHO\:LWKRXW
VXFKVLPSOLFLW\WKHHIÀFLHQF\RIDIDVWODQHLVORVWLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKREHORQJVWKHUH$V
Goldman noted at the Roundtable, despite the poor drafting of § 230, courts developed a 
fairly sharp-edged understanding of its boundaries.) I think of this as an “if/then” statement, 
where both the “if” and the “then” must be clear. If you purchase 10 or fewer items, WKHQ you 
may check out in this lane. If\RXRIIHUDGHÀQHG´LQWHUDFWLYHFRPSXWHUVHUYLFHµ5 WKHQ you 
will not be liable for statements made through that service by others6 (except under certain 
GHÀQHG W\SHVRI FODLPVQDPHO\FULPLQDO ODZ LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ ODZRU WKH(OHFWURQLF
Communications Privacy Act7). For a trademark fast lane to function properly, it must have 
similarly clear criteria, both for eligibility and for the resulting outcome.
Second, many shoppers use the slow lanes instead of the fast one. They wish to buy 
more than 10 items and they accept the longer wait as a consequence. The supermarket 
manager needs these other lanes to move expeditiously too, and may institute various re-
forms to speed them up (perhaps new cash registers or better training for workers). If the 
PDQDJHUFRQFHQWUDWHVRQO\RQLPSURYLQJWKHHIÀFLHQF\RIWKHIDVWODQHRWKHUFXVWRPHUVDUH
condemned to grocery-store purgatory and may shop elsewhere, or purchase fewer items to 
speed their checkout. And if everyone starts crowding into the fast lane to escape, it will 
not remain fast. Some suggestions for reform of trademark law may suffer from a desire to 
À[HYHU\SUREOHPZLWKMXVWRQHWRRO&RPSUHKHQVLYHUHIRUPUHTXLUHVQRWRQO\GHYHORSPHQW
RIDIDVWODQHEXWDOVRDWWHQWLRQWRWKHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVDQGLQHTXDOLWLHVLQDOOWKHRWKHUODQHV
These are distinct problems with largely distinct solutions. By combining different mecha-
nisms, however, we can divide cases into different groups and apply different approaches 
to each one.
Earlier in the Roundtable, I offered another (and probably less effective) analogy, com-
paring this task to service on a law school admissions committee. The committee divides 
DSSOLFDQWV LQWR WKUHHSLOHVDGPLW UHMHFWDQGFRQVLGHU2EYLRXVO\TXDOLÀHGDQGREYLRXVO\
XQTXDOLÀHGVWXGHQWVERWKSUHVHQWHDV\FDVHVWKDWUHTXLUHOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQIUHHLQJXSWKHFRP-
mittee’s time for more careful consideration of the borderline candidates placed in the middle 
pile. This “three piles” analogy does add one useful complication to the “fast lane” analogy, 
because it emphasizes that heuristics can speed consideration of cases in both directions—
with shortcuts on one side favoring the markholder and on the other side favoring the alleged 
infringer. Cases in the middle take longer (but hopefully not too long) because we do not use 
shortcuts favoring either side.8 This analogy also underscores two conditions under which 
WKHV\VWHPGRHVQRWZRUNLILWLVWRRGLIÀFXOWWRGHFLGHLQZKLFKSLOHWRSXWDQDSSOLFDWLRQRU
if consideration of the middle pile is excessively burdensome.
Several Roundtable participants, in their own ways, propose comparable sorting of trade-
mark cases. For instance, a number of participants are drawn to the idea of a “materiality” 
requirement for some trademark cases. Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna recently argued 
for “anchor[ing] once again to the core case of confusion regarding the actual source of a 
defendant’s product or service, the type of confusion most obviously related to consumer 
decision making.”9 In those traditional cases (along with ones where consumers believe the 
markholder guarantees the quality of a defendant’s goods and services), they say, courts 
should continue to presume materiality without requiring proof from a markholder. In a 
wide range of other cases, however, markholders would need to demonstrate that the al-
leged consumer confusion is likely to affect consumers’ purchasing decisions.10 These cases 
would proceed in a manner more akin to false advertising law, where materiality is an ele-
ment that the plaintiff must prove to prevail. Even in these nontraditional cases, however, 
courts might sometimes relieve markholders of the duty to prove harm. As Tushnet, another 
materiality proponent, points out in her forthcoming work, false advertising doctrines have 
developed over time which presume materiality in certain kinds of cases, such as those in-
volving outright falsity or bad intent.11 Even though proposals like Lemley and McKenna’s 
and Tushnet’s would demand proof of materiality in many more trademark infringement 
2QHIXUWKHUUHÀQHPHQWWKDWGRHVQRWQHHGWRFOXWWHUWKHWH[WEXWVKRXOGEHQRWHGUHDOOLWLJDWLRQLQYROYHVPXO-
tiple issues, and we really sort cases one issue at a time. So, suppose a case presents a knotty issue over whether 
a mark is generic, but the alleged infringer has used an identical mark on identical goods. The case would be 
routed to the middle pile for genericism, but then might move faster to resolve the subsequent cut-and-dried 
issues. Once the mark is valid, there is no need for a dozen Methodist bishops to testify individually that they 
were confused by an identical usage.
9.  Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, ,UUHOHYDQW&RQIXVLRQ, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 414–15 (2010).
10.  Id. at 450–52.
11.  See Rebecca Tushnet, 5XQQLQJWKH*DPXW)URP$WR%)HGHUDO7UDGHPDUNDQG)DOVH$GYHUWLVLQJ/DZ, 
159 Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010); VHHDOVR Lemley & McKenna, VXSUDQRWHDWPHQWLRQLQJEULHÁ\WKH
same possibility of presumptions).
27IP THEORY Volume 1:  Issue 1
28 IP THEORY   Volume 1:  Issue 1
12.  Margreth Barrett, $&DXVHRI$FWLRQIRU´3DVVLQJ2II$VVRFLDWLRQDO0DUNHWLQJ,” 1 IP Theory 1, 13–15 
(2010) [manuscript at 13-15].
13.  See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 7UDGHPDUNVDQG&RQVXPHU6HDUFK&RVWVRQWKH,QWHUQHW, 41 Hous. 
L. Rev. 777, 805 (2004); Uli Widmaier, 8VH/LDELOLW\DQGWKH6WUXFWXUHRI7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 
603, 621–24 (2004). As several of us have argued elsewhere, the trademark use requirement may not function as 
a good fast lane because it does not have clear enough eligibility criteria. Instead of a bright-line rule (10 items 
RUIHZHUGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDXVHTXDOLÀHVDVQRQWUDGHPDUNXVHRIWHQLPSOLFDWHVPDQ\RIWKHVDPHIDFW
intensive inquiries explored under the likelihood of confusion test, which are just the ones we are trying to avoid. 
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, &RQIXVLRQ2YHU8VH&RQWH[WXDOLVPLQ7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 92 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1597, 1645 (2007); William McGeveran, 5HWKLQNLQJ7UDGHPDUN)DLU8VH, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 49, 79-80 
(2008); Mark P. McKenna, 7UDGHPDUN8VHDQGWKH3UREOHPRI6RXUFH, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 773, 821-24 (2009).
14.  See William McGeveran, 7KH7UDGHPDUN)DLU8VH5HIRUP$FW, 90 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
15.  Several of us raised this concern at the Roundtable, and Barrett laid it out in her essay afterwards. See Bar-
rett, VXSUD note 12, at 19–20.
cases than under present doctrine, they still would relieve markholders of this duty in certain 
FDWHJRULFDOO\GHÀQHGVLWXDWLRQV
Like materiality, other reform proposals also engage in this sorting exercise. Margreth 
Barrett suggested after the Roundtable that four categories of trademark claims could be 
reframed as “associational marketing” claims under § 43(a), requiring a broader and more 
context-sensitive analysis.12 Proponents of a robust “trademark use” requirement likewise 
have said that it could serve a “gatekeeper” function, shunting some cases onto a different 
(and faster) track.13$QG,KDYHDUJXHGIRUGHÀQHGFDWHJRULFDOH[HPSWLRQVIURPOLDELOLW\IRU
certain unlicensed uses of trademarks.14 
$OOWKHVHPRGHOVGHÀQHFHUWDLQFDWHJRULHVIRUVSHFLDOL]HGWUHDWPHQW%XWIHZDFWXDOO\FUHDWH
any fast lanes. A number of them, on closer examination, would improve the functioning of the 
other lanes instead. Or, returning to the image of the three piles, many of these proposals would 
move cases from the markholder-friendly pile to the middle pile, where they would receive 
more searching analysis. Requiring proof of materiality, for instance, adds additional empirical 
issues that must be resolved. In general, cases where materiality must be proven will require 
more time and more resources for adjudication, because another complex and fact-intensive 
question has been added to the mix.15 If false advertising is the model, materiality inquiries 
may require competing consumer surveys and a battle of expert witnesses. While the shift to a 
PDWHULDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWEHQHÀWVDOOHJHGLQIULQJHUVLWGRHVQRWGRVRSULPDULO\E\PDNLQJFDVHV
more predictable, easier, or cheaper to adjudicate. Rather, it increases careful analysis and ju-
dicial involvement in some cases where we now assume facts that point toward infringement.
So, the proposals are similar in their reliance on categorizing and rerouting certain classes 
of cases for different treatment. But they differ, crucially, in the amount of friction they cre-
ate in individual cases. While using many of the same civil procedure mechanisms named at 
16.  See Robert G. Bone, (QIRUFHPHQW&RVWVDQG7UDGHPDUN3X]]OHV, 90 Va. L. Rev. 2099, 2123–2124 (2004).
17.  See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Wham-O, Inc v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d. 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003); VHHDOVR Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9, at 
416–22 (suggesting other examples).
the outset—presumptions, defenses, and burdens—the various proposals assemble these into 
quite different combinations. I certainly do not advocate choosing between reforms; most of 
these ideas complement one another. Talking about the same mechanisms in different ways, 
however, can cause confusion. I want to touch on each of these concepts as they relate to the 
Roundtable topic: analyzing defensive doctrines in trademark law.
Presumptions infuse all of these proposals. At their simplest, presumptions are shortcuts 
that replace particularized factual analysis with general situation-based rules. Lawyers use the 
word in so many contexts, however, that it can become misleading. (Rebuttable, irrebuttable, 
and bursting-bubble presumptions share the name but function quite differently.) The relevant 
point for our Roundtable discussion is simpler: as Bone has explained, trademark law already 
employs many presumptions, which represent classic tradeoffs between administrative costs 
and error costs.16 These presumptions reduce administrative costs, but may reduce accuracy 
as well. Sometimes they effectively determine ultimate liability, but often they resolve only 
preliminary or intermediate issues. If we are sorting properly, we will devote the most deci-
VLRQPDNLQJ UHVRXUFHV WRGLIÀFXOWTXHVWLRQV WKDWGHVHUYH VXFKDWWHQWLRQ ,QHDVLHU FDVHV WKH
administrative costs are not worth any marginally increased accuracy. Instead, we can rely on 
SUHVXPSWLRQVIDYRULQJWKHVLGHWKDWDFRXUWSUREDEO\WKRXJKSHUKDSVQRWGHÀQLWHO\ZRXOG
favor on that point if it examined the question more closely. In other words, we will use pre-
sumptions in the two side piles but not in the middle pile.
Lemley, McKenna, and Tushnet want to discard an existing presumption (materiality) in 
VRPHGHÀQHGFDVHV DQGPRYH WKRVHFDVHV IURP WKHPDUNKROGHUIULHQGO\SLOH WR WKHPLGGOH
pile. Generally speaking, this will increase administrative costs for those cases, but should 
also increase precision in results. That greater precision favors unlicensed users. However, in 
real-world disputes between heavily invested markholders and unlicensed users, administrative 
costs almost always disadvantage the latter. Even where trademark law clearly allows a use, the 
mere threat of lengthy, complex, and expensive litigation scares unlicensed users. This is how 
cease and desist letters achieve their in terrorem power. My project complements theirs, by cre-
ating cost-reducing presumptions immediately, moving some cases directly into the pile where 
presumptions favor the user. In those cases, we would accept less precision to create a fast lane.
Not only are the two reforms consistent, the one can lead to the other. After taking away the 
presumption of materiality, other presumptions might develop. Some of these new ones prob-
ably would favor the alleged infringer. For example, courts applying a materiality require-
ment to the middle pile may observe over time that markholders can never prove material 
KDUPIURPÁHHWLQJJOLPSVHVRIDEUDQGQDPHLQDPRYLHRUWHOHYLVLRQSURJUDP17 They might 
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18.  See Barrett, VXSUD note 12, at 18–23.
)RUDQH[HPSODU\OLVWRIORQJHVWDEOLVKHGDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHVVHHFed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (listing, inter alia, 
laches, res judicata, and statute of limitations defenses).
20.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, /HZLV	&ODUN/DZ6FKRRO1LQWK'LVWLQJXLVKHG,3/HFWXUH'HYHORSLQJ'H-
IHQVHVLQ7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 99, 144–152 (2009).
21.  Id. at 100.
22.  543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004).
then begin to impose a presumption against materiality in such cases. This eventually could 
become robust enough to establish something approaching a categorical liability exemption 
IRUÀOPPDNHUVXVLQJEUDQGQDPHV7KDWLVWKHW\SHRIIDLUXVHSUHVXPSWLRQ,KDYHDGYRFDWHG
and a materiality requirement might be one route to get there (after a lot of cases wound 
their way through the judiciary). Barrett makes the same point in her new essay, arguing 
that certain “limitations and defenses” could be applied to the middle-pile cases she groups 
together as associational marketing, effectively moving them not only to the middle pile but 
to the pile on the other end of the table.18,QWKLVZD\DGHÀQHGVXEVHWRIFDVHVHYHQWXDOO\
could become entitled to use a fast lane. That said, the primary doctrinal innovation in these 
proposals is not to create new shortcuts that favor the users of marks, it is to eliminate old 
shortcuts that favor markholders. They would increase, not reduce, administrative costs for 
the foreseeable future. A reform agenda that did not address those costs in some other way 
would be incomplete.
Defenses were, loosely speaking, the topic of the Roundtable. More precisely, however, 
we convened to discuss defensive doctrines, which might include mechanisms other than 
IRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHV19 Graeme Dinwoodie recently expanded on this broader under-
standing of trademark “defenses.”20+HGHÀQHGWKHPDV´UXOHVSHUPLWWLQJXQDXWKRUL]HGXVHV
RIPDUNVHYHQZKHUHVXFKXVHVLPSOLFDWHWKHDIÀUPDWLYHFRQFHUQVRIWUDGHPDUNODZµ21 At the 
5RXQGWDEOHRXUODQJXDJHZDVQRWDOZD\VDVFDUHIXO$WÀUVWIRUH[DPSOHVRPHFRPPHQWV
(including mine) distinguished “internal” requirements from “external” ones—meaning that 
the former were integrated in the prima facie infringement case while the latter were not. 
This distinction, while perhaps useful in some contexts, was not necessarily relevant to the 
FUHDWLRQRIIDVWODQHV2EYLRXVO\IRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHVDUHQRWDGHIHQGDQW·VRQO\SDWK
to victory, and they need not be the only route for a fast lane. As the Supreme Court summed 
up a defendant’s varied options in .33HUPDQHQW0DNH8S,QFY/DVWLQJ,PSUHVVLRQ,,QF:
If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of trademark infringement, includ-
ing the element of likelihood of consumer confusion, the defendant may offer rebutting 
evidence to undercut the force of the plaintiff’s evidence on this (or any) element, or raise 
DQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHWREDUUHOLHIHYHQLIWKHSULPDIDFLHFDVHLVVRXQGRUGRERWK22 
If the defendant can use any of these means to prevail quickly and simply, then broadly they 
can be called defensive doctrines and they can serve as fast lanes.
23.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2), 8(e).
24.  See Eric Goldman, 1LQWK&LUFXLW+HOSIXOO\$PHQGVBarnes v. Yahoo2SLQLRQ, Tech. & Marketing Law 
Blog (June 22, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/ninth_circuit_h.htm (discussing amend-
ment of opinion in Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) that eliminated characterization of § 230 
LPPXQLW\DVDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
25.  Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 682 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); VHHDOVRHJ., Ladd v. 
Uecker, 780 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
0RGHUQFRXUWVSD\UHODWLYHO\OLWWOHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYH
defenses and other defensive doctrines. The )HGHUDO5XOHVRI&LYLO3URFHGXUH specify that 
courts generally should disregard a defendant’s failure to label defenses properly in a respon-
sive pleading.23 Whether one calls a particular doctrine a “defense” (or “external” to the prima 
IDFLHFDVHPD\QRWPDWWHUYHU\PXFK7KHWHUPFDQUHIHUWRDIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHEXW
also for our purposes to any doctrine that allows the defendant to prevail notwithstanding the 
existence of some key indicia of liability. And the most common usage of the word is the least 
precise of all: a simple denial of the plaintiff’s accusation (“I didn’t do it”) is a “defense” too, 
though it speaks only to the prima facie case. If bolstered by presumptions, such denials can 
function as fast lanes.
$WWLPHVLWFDQEHGLIÀFXOWHYHQWRFODVVLI\DGHIHQVLYHGRFWULQHDVLQWHUQDORUH[WHUQDOLQWKH
sense used at the Roundtable. Although the statutory language of § 230 is expressed as an ex-
FOXVLRQIURPSRWHQWLDOOLDELOLW\UDWKHUWKDQLQWKHIRUPRIDQLQGHSHQGHQWDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
there has been some judicial confusion about its precise status.24 Whether or not it is part of 
WKHSULPDIDFLHFDVHRUDIRUPDOGHIHQVHDQDUJXPHQWWKDWDOLWLJDQWTXDOLÀHVIRULP-
munity should be seen as a GHIHQVLYHGRFWULQH. Defendants can (and do) invoke this argument 
early in litigation, destroying the case against them. This is a fast lane. The same ambiguity 
also can be seen in the evolution of defamation law. Traditionally, proving the truth of an al-
OHJHGO\GHIDPDWRU\VWDWHPHQWJDYHULVHWRDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHWRGHIDPDWLRQOLDELOLW\7KH
falsity of the statement later evolved into a required element of the prima facie case in the 
large majority of states. In the actual functioning of litigation, however, little changed. Courts 
still refer to truth informally as a “defense,” epitomized by one 2009 state appellate decision 
which declared, “Because falsity is an essential element of both libel and slander, truth is a 
perfect defense to a defamation action.”25 The ambiguity (and perhaps even irrelevance) of the 
formal status of truth as an element or a defense—as “internal” or “external”—demonstrates 
that this is not the crucial question. Of course, truth is such a fact-intensive issue in defama-
tion cases that it rarely allows for fast-lane disposition, regardless of whether it is an element 
RUDGHIHQVH+HUHDVXVXDOWKHGHIHQVLYHGRFWULQH·VFRPSOH[LW\PDWWHUVPRUHWKDQLWVRIÀFLDO
status under civil procedure.
Burdens, as Bone pointed out in his Roundtable remarks, are fundamental to the design 
of these decisionmaking structures. Here again, though, we should introduce greater pre-
cision. First, in our discussion we often spoke of burdens without specifying their exact 
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26.  See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (discussing burden-shifting structure 
of federal employment discrimination litigation); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
(same).
27.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1965) (explaining allocation of burdens in situations where 
a harm is the sort normally presumed to derive from negligence).
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VUHFHQWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVLQSOHDGLQJVWDQGDUGVDQGLQWURGXFWLRQRI´SODXVLELOLW\µUH-
quirements may make burdens of pleading more important for plaintiffs. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); VHHDOVR Rebecca Tushnet, 8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ
DQG8QFRPPRQ6HQVH, 95 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 17, 18-20 (2009), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_
Tushnet.pdf (analyzing possible impact of 7ZRPEO\ and ,TEDO in trademark litigation). It is not yet clear how 
these developments will affect defendants as opposed to plaintiffs. Moreover, as noted below, in straightforward 
cases it should be easy to plead the existence of fair use, even under the newer standard.
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nature. There are many kinds of burdens, including burdens of pleading, production, and 
persuasion. In the normal civil case, all these burdens are assigned to the plaintiff, who must 
plead the necessary elements of the prima facie case, produce evidence in support of those 
HOHPHQWVDQGSHUVXDGHDÀQGHURIIDFWWKDWDSUHSRQGHUDQFHRIWKHHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVWKH
defendant’s liability. Courts depart from this default rule in special situations, most famously 
in employment discrimination,26 but also in circumstances such as the application of res ipsa 
loquitur.27
More important, participants often took it for granted that all burdens are—well, burden-
some. In practice, this is not always so. As noted above, burdens of pleading are seldom 
dispositive in modern litigation.28%XUGHQVRISURGXFWLRQFDQLPSRVHGLIÀFXOWLHVLIHYLGHQFH
LVHVSHFLDOO\GLIÀFXOWWRSURFXUHEXWJHQHUDOO\WKH\MXVWDVVLJQWKHSDUW\ZKRPXVWPDNHWKH
ÀUVWPRYHWREDFNXSDFODLP%XUGHQVRISHUVXDVLRQ³SURRI³KDYHWKHPRVWELWH(YHQKHUH
however, the allocation of the burden matters only in close cases. When the body of evidence 
SRLQWVVLJQLÀFDQWO\RQHZD\RUWKHRWKHUWKDWVLGHSUHYDLOVQRPDWWHUZKLFKRQHFDUULHVWKH
burden. In other words, burdens of persuasion serve as tiebreakers. If a case is not already in 
equipoise, they do not have much weight. The cases where burdens of persuasion matter are 
precisely the close ones that belong in the middle pile. By contrast, the cases eligible for the 
fast lane should be those where the outcome was fairly predictable from the beginning, far 
from equipoise. Applying presumptions to those cases, as discussed above, further lightens 
any burden of persuasion. 
)RUPDO burdens of pleading, persuasion, and proof do not necessarily align with DFWXDO 
EXUGHQVRIFRVWGLIÀFXOW\RUSRVVLEOHGHIHDW$WWLPHVGLVFXVVLRQDWWKH5RXQGWDEOHIRFXVHG
RQUHOLHYLQJIDLUXVHVRURWKHUEHQHÀFLDOWKLUGSDUW\XVHVRIDPDUNIURPIRUPDOEXUGHQV
rather than from actual ones. The plaintiff carries all the formal burdens to demonstrate likeli-
hood of confusion, but no sensible defendant sits idly on the sidelines hoping to win by the 
weakness of the plaintiff’s evidence. Defendants naturally must hire their own experts, com-
mission their own surveys, and brief their own interpretation of the convoluted multifactor 
test.29 In reality, they escape only the feather-light pleading burden on the confusion point 
(and many defendants choose to insert boilerplate denials of confusion in their answers any-
way). They still carry actual burdens of production and persuasion. The same would be true 
of any element of the prima facie case placing a burden on the plaintiff to produce evidence 
that proves a complex factual claim—it imposes an actual, if not a formal, burden on the 
defendant as well. Demanding that the plaintiff prove materiality, for example, necessarily 
demands that the defendant rebut that proof, probably with its own evidence. I do nott mean 
to say that formal burdens are unimportant, only that they tell just part of the story.
Some court decisions contribute to a misguided focus on formal rather than actual burdens. 
KP Permanent has been read, appropriately, as a case about allocating burdens of proof, but 
some observers forget that the Court there analyzed those burdens as a means of statutory 
FRQVWUXFWLRQWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHRIGHVFULSWLYHXVHXQGHUE
(4) was vitiated by the existence of a likelihood of confusion).30 The main thrust of the deci-
sion was to interpret the text, not to rescue defendants from formal burdens.31 In &HQWXU\
5HDO(VWDWH&RUSY/HQGLQJWUHH,QF., the Third Circuit overreacted to KP Permanent when 
LWVWULFWO\FRQÀQHGWKHQRPLQDWLYHXVHGRFWULQHWRDUROHDVDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH32 This rigid 
structure may have distributed formal burdens fairly, but in reality it limited the defendant’s 
options and increased actual burdens. A defendant with a strong nominative use claim would 
EHIRUFHGQRQHWKHOHVVWRUHIXWHHYLGHQFHRIFRQIXVLRQXQGHUWKHPXOWLIDFWRUWHVWÀUVWEHIRUH
any consideration of the defense. Judge Kozinski (the original creator of the nominative use 
test) presented a much more sensible structure for burdens in nominative use in a very recent 
Ninth Circuit decision, 7R\RWD0RWRU6DOHV86$,QFY7DEDUL.33 In 7DEDUL, the Ninth Cir-
cuit maintained its precedent that makes nominative use a substitute confusion test (that is, a 
defensive doctrine but not a true formal defense). As to burdens, the court held:
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29.  See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008); McGeveran, VXSUD note 13, 
at 70–71 (discussing the length and cost of :DO0DUW litigation).
30.  The Court wisely concluded that the design of the statute contemplated a distinct inquiry into descriptive-
ness, however the confusion inquiry came out. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 543 
86´>,@WZRXOGPDNHQRVHQVHWRJLYHWKHGHIHQGDQWDGHIHQVHRIVKRZLQJDIÀUPDWLYHO\WKDW
the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some element (like confusion); all the defendant needs to do is to leave 
WKHIDFWÀQGHUXQSHUVXDGHGWKDWWKHSODLQWLIIKDVFDUULHGLWVRZQEXUGHQRQWKDWSRLQWµ$VQRWHGDERYHKRZHY-
HUWKH&RXUWDOVRHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWKDVPXOWLSOHRSWLRQVIRUSUHYDLOLQJDQGWKHDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
under § 33(b)(4) is only one of them. 6HHVXSUD note 22 and accompanying text.
31.  Of course, the Ninth Circuit’s previous practice of requiring defendants to disprove likelihood of confusion 
GLGLQFUHDVHWKHLUDFWXDOEXUGHQVVLJQLÀFDQWO\<HWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQFKDQJHGWKHVLWXDWLRQOHVVWKDQ
PLJKWKDYHEHHQH[SHFWHGEHFDXVHGHIHQGDQWVFRQWLQXHWRIDFHDVLJQLÀFDQWDFWXDOEXUGHQ³DVVKRZQE\WKH
Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 
596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005).
32.  425 F.3d 211 (3d. Cir. 2005).
33.  610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
A defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a defense need only show that it used 
the mark to refer to the trademarked good, as the Tabaris undoubtedly have here. The bur-
den then reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion.34 
The defendant must raise the issue (essentially a burden of pleading), but then the formal 
burdens shift. More importantly, Judge Kozinski’s structure spares the defendant the actual 
EXUGHQRIPRXQWLQJDIXOOFRQIXVLRQGHIHQVH&HUWDLQO\WKLVTXDOLÀHVDVDIDVWODQH
In sum, effective reform of defensive doctrines in trademark law will require precise 
thinking about the related concepts of presumptions, defenses, and burdens. That reform 
VKRXOGLQFOXGHIDVWODQHV,QP\YLHZVRPHLGHQWLÀDEOHFDWHJRULHVRIHDV\FDVHVVKRXOGZKL]
through the courthouse at top speed. Uses in those categories ought to enjoy a presumption 
against liability. Where such presumptions arise, we could say that a “defense” exists, though 
LWQHHGQRWVKDUHDOOWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH7KHUHVXOWLQJGRFWUL-
nal structure may assign formal burdens in a variety of ways, but it creates effective fast lanes 
only if actual burdens on the defendant remain minimal.35
For the cases that do not qualify for a fast lane, we will have to turn to other approaches. 
Some of these other reforms might be called “defenses” too, and they may use presumptions 
and burdens as tools. Where they increase actual burdens, however, these other ideas do not 
create fast lanes. The resulting administrative costs created by these reforms will make some 
fair uses legal in theory but hazardous in reality. That may be unavoidable for complex dis-
putes that require fact-intensive analysis, but trademark fair use ought to strive for fast-lane 
treatment in categories where the damage to free speech predictably outweighs the threat to 
trademarks’ economic functions.
Dialogue at the Roundtable helped force these important issues of procedural design, and 
their accompanying normative consequences, to the surface. As we continue to debate the 
best ways to improve trademark law, and particularly its defensive doctrines, I know I will 
pay greater attention to the complexity of presumptions, defenses, and burdens.
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34.  Id. at 1183.
35.  I describe these ideas in detail in a forthcoming article. See McGeveran, VXSUD note 14.
